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travellers	 played	 in	 the	 introduction	 and	 propagation	 of	 influenza	A/H1N1pdm09	
virus	in	Iceland	through	the	course	of	the	2009	pandemic.














airport.	The	 techniques	described	 in	 this	 study	can	be	used	 for	hypothesis‐driven	
evaluations	of	 locations	and	behaviours	during	an	epidemic	and	 their	 associations	
with	health	outcomes.
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1  | INTRODUC TION







provide	a	granular	understanding	of	disease	dynamics	 in	 real	 time	
that	vastly	exceeds	what	can	be	delivered	by	conventional	surveil‐
lance	systems.1‐4
The	 mechanisms	 of	 international	 propagation	 of	 communica‐
ble	diseases	remain	an	 important	 topic	 in	 the	study	of	pandemics.	
Influenza	 A/H1N1pdm09	 virus	 was	 first	 detected	 in	 the	 United	
States	 in	April	2009	and	 resulted	 in	approximately	200	000	 labo‐
ratory‐confirmed	deaths	worldwide	over	the	span	of	the	first	year	
of	 virus	 circulation.5‐9	 The	pandemic	 spread	outwards	 from	urban	
travel	 hubs	 and	 took	 advantage	 of	 the	 relatively	 innocuous	 initial	
symptoms	of	an	infectious	carrier,	with	international	travellers	play‐






















data	 set	 for	 epidemiological	 analysis.	 Finally,	 as	 we	 show	 below,	




health	 records	 including	 influenza‐like	 illness	 (ILI)	 diagnoses,	 near‐
ubiquitous	mobile	phone	use	and	one	 likely	port	of	entry:	Keflavik	
International	Airport.19‐22	We	obtained	anonymized	CDR	metadata	
from	one	of	 Iceland's	 largest	mobile	network	operators	during	 the	










social	 networks	over	 the	 course	of	 the	 epidemic.	 These	 investiga‐
tions	demonstrate	the	relevance	of	CDR	to	epidemiologic	research.
2  | METHODS
2.1 | Study population and design
We	performed	a	nested	case‐control	study	of	Icelanders	diagnosed	
with	an	ILI	between	January	2009	and	March	2010.	The	source	pop‐











2.2 | Data sets—MNO call detail records
Our	CDR	provide	anonymized	mobile	phone	use	data	from	30%	to	
40%	of	 the	 Icelandic	population	over	 the	course	of	18	months,	 in‐
cluding	the	6	months	at	the	peak	of	H1N1pdm09	virus	circulation	in	
Iceland	from	August	through	December	of	2009.	The	CDR	database	
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at	hospitals	in	Iceland.23	The	database	of	ILI	diagnoses	for	this	study	
contained	a	record	of	all	individuals	diagnosed	with	an	ILI	who	were	
in	 the	CDR	database	and	 included	 their	date	of	diagnosis	 and	en‐
crypted	national	identification	numbers	(ENIN),	comprising	approxi‐
mately	half	of	all	ILI	cases.
2.4 | Data acquisition and cleaning
The	MNO	provided	 the	CDC‐CHS	with	a	 list	of	 encrypted	mobile	
numbers	 and	 national	 identification	 numbers.	 The	CDC‐CHS	 then	



















tower	 through	which	most	 of	 the	 user's	 interactions	were	 routed	
between	the	hours	of	7	pm and 7 am
2.5 | Variables
We	defined	cases	as	exposed	 if	 they	had	a	mobile	phone	 interac‐












matched	 odds	 ratios	 (mORs)	 associating	 exposure	 to	 Keflavik	




tured	both	 the	 incubation	and	 infectious	period	of	H1N1pdm09.	




2.7 | Positive inferential control locations
We	selected	the	Landspítali	University	Hospital,	the	 largest	hospi‐
tal	in	Reykjavík,	and	the	domestic	airport	in	Akureyri,	a	remote	city	
in	northern	 Iceland,	as	positive	 inferential	control	 locations.	These	
selections	rest	on	the	validity	of	the	following	assumptions:	we	ex‐
pect	to	see	 increase	 in	the	odds	of	exposure	to	the	hospital,	since	








Distinct	MNO	IDs	in	CDR	corpus	February	2009‐June	2012 342 369 107.2%
of	which	mobile	subscription	data	were	available 218 879 68.5%
of	which	subscriber	had	a	single	ENIN 171 406 53.7%









TA B L E  1  Original	and	derived	data	
sets	used	in	our	study
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Two-week matched odds ratio of exposure to 
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Negative control: Akureyri Domestic Airport
TA B L E  2  Associations	between	exposures	of	interest	and	subsequent	ILI	diagnosis	with	controls	matched	on	home	tower	location
 Period of interesta
Initial stages of the 
epidemicb
Two‐week period of high 
risk in initial stagesc
Comparison two‐week 
period in epidemic peakd
Primary	exposures	of	interest—mOR	[95%	CI]
Keflavik	International	Airport 0.88	[0.39,	3.57] 1.51	[0.71,	3.6] 2.53	[1.35,	4.78] 0.68	[0.43,	1.08]
Landspítali	Hospital	in	Reykjavik 0.71	[0.39,	3.33] 0.96	[0.25,	4.64] 0.92	[0.22,	3.84] 1.12	[0.73,	1.72]
Negative	control—mOR	[95%	CI]
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2.8 | Negative inferential control locations
There	are	 several	domestic	 airports	 in	 Iceland	 that	provide	 regular	










stages	of	 the	epidemic	 suggest	 that	elevated	associations	near	 the	
international	airport	at	the	preliminary	stages	of	the	epidemic	arise	
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26 October: Akureyri Domestic Airport
Locations and their associations with influenza-like illness
 during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic in Iceland







and	 text	 data	 read	 into	 Bandicoot.	 Restrictions	 described	 above	



















the	major	hospital	 immediately	before	the	 increase	 in	cases	 in	 the	
epidemic	curve,	and	ending	with	the	peak	in	Akureyri	during	the	epi‐
demic	peak	(Figures	2,3).









 See Figure 3
2009-09-30: 
Spike at Main Hospital
 See Figure 3
2009-10-26: 
Spike at Akureyri











Epidemic curve of influenza-like illness (ILI) during the 2009
 H1N1 pandemic in Iceland from August through December 2009
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3.4 | Negative inferential controls










We	conducted	 an	 analysis	 of	 10‐day	 rate	 of	 ILI	within	 1st‐degree	
connections	 among	 cases	 and	 controls	 during	 the	 initial	 period	of	
the	epidemic	and	during	the	epidemic	peak,	in	both	exposure	levels.	
During	the	initial	period	of	the	epidemic,	1st‐degree	connections	of	




1st‐degree	 connections	 of	 controls.	 Similarly,	 2nd‐degree	 connec‐
tions	of	cases	had	an	ILI	rate	that	was	4.09	times	greater	than	2nd‐
degree	connections	of	controls	(95%	CI:	3.81,	4.41)	during	the	initial	
period	of	 the	epidemic,	 compared	with	during	 the	epidemic	peak,	
when	2nd‐degree	connections	of	cases	had	an	ILI	rate	that	was	2.05	




Our	 study	 evaluated	 the	 role	 that	 international	 travellers	 played	










We	 evaluated	 the	 rates	 of	 ILI	 among	 1st‐degree	 connections	 of	
cases	compared	with	1st‐degree	connections	of	controls.	We	ex‐
pected	 the	 comparative	 incidence	 density	 ratio	 (IDR)	 to	 be	 high	
during	the	 initial	stages	of	the	epidemic	and	the	data	aggregated	
TA B L E  3  The	analysis	of	two‐week	moving	incidence	density	
ratio	(IDR)	shows	that	call	detail	records	(CDR)	contact	networks	
behave	similarly	to	real‐world	physical	contact	networks




of high risk in Initial 
Stagesa
Comparison two‐week 






































Incidence density ratios of influenza like
 illness among top 150 friends of 1st (blue) and
 2nd (red) degree connections
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from	 the	 call	 detail	 records	 confirmed	 our	 belief	 (Figure	 4).	Our	
data	show	that	there	was	a	higher	rate	of	transmission	to	1st‐de‐
gree	connections	earlier	in	the	epidemic.	However,	even	during	the	







networks.	 The	 elevated	 IDR	 in	 both	 networks	 decrease	 through	






4.4 | Locations and their roles in an epidemic
We	 saw	 temporally	 local	 amplification	 of	 odds	 of	 ILI	 associated	
with	specific	regions	of	interest.	The	utility	of	this	type	of	evalu‐
ation	 is	 especially	 important	 in	 the	 progression	 of	 an	 epidemic.	




controls.	 As	 there	 is	 only	 one	major	 point	 of	 entry	 into	 Iceland,	
we	expect	an	epidemic	 to	be	 introduced	 there	 first,	 followed	by	
transmission	 in	 areas	where	 sick	 patients	 congregate,	 such	 as	 a	
major	 hospital,	 and	 finally	 a	 remote	 city	 during	 the	 peak	 of	 the	
epidemic	 in	 the	 general	 population.	 As	 expected,	 we	 saw	 clear	
spikes	in	2‐week	odds	of	exposure	to	geographic	locations,	mov‐
ing	temporally	from	7	August	through	14	November,	and	moving	
from	 the	Keflavik	 International	 Airport	 to	 Landspítali	 University	
Hospital	 in	 Reykjavík	 and	 finally	 to	 the	 remote	 city	 of	 Akureyri	
after	the	epidemic	peak.
4.5 | Limitations
Call	detail	 records	for	 this	study	were	captured	 in	2009	and	2010	




send	 texts	 or	 use	 mobile	 data.	 In	 contrast,	 current	 smartphones	












incidences	 are,	 by	 definition,	 sparse	 in	 data	 and	 will	 inherently	
show	 greater	 variation	 in	 the	 time	 period	 before	 and	 after	 an	
epidemic.
Our	study	was	 limited	to	the	use	of	data	 from	 individuals	who	
had	an	ENIN,	 in	this	case	all	 Icelandic	residents.	While	foreign	vis‐
itors	 may	 have	 played	 a	 role	 in	 the	 propagation	 of	 the	 epidemic,	
they	would	be	difficult	 to	 locate	 in	 the	national	electronic	disease	
surveillance	system	without	a	local	ENIN.	Furthermore,	it	would	be	
challenging	 to	 define	 a	 comparable	 control	 for	 this	 group	 as	 their	
limited	CDR	information	may	be	too	sparse	to	define	variables	such	
as	“home	tower.”
Finally,	 the	use	of	 ILI	diagnosis	found	 in	the	electronic	medical	










been	 registered	with	 6	 billion	 projected	 by	 2020.29	Modern	 CDR	
include	 considerably	 more	 data	 transfer	 information,	 allowing	 for	
more	robust	analyses	of	location	and	fewer	threats	to	validity	from	
misclassification.	These	data	sources	can	provide	an	opportunity	for	
both	 retrospective	 research	 and	 prospective	 disease	 surveillance.	
Through	greater	collaboration	with	both	mobile	network	operators	
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